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Abstract
This study evaluates the effect of Chile’s pension system rules and reg-
ulations on individuals’ contribution and working decisions. In 1980
Chile was the first country to switch from a pay-as-you-go system to a
privatized system based on individual investment accounts; then it has
since been a model for pension reforms in many other Latin American
countries. The Chilean system has also been considered by U.S. policy
makers as a possible prototype for reform. This paper develops and
estimates a dynamic behavioral model of individual decision-making
about formal or informal sector employment and about pension con-
tributions, accounting for regulations that govern the timing and level
of pension benefits. Model parameters are obtained by the method of
simulated maximum likelihood applied to longitudinal data from a new
household survey, the Social Protection Survey (2002 to 2004), and ad-
ministrative data from the pension regulatory agency. The estimated
model is used to simulate the impact on employment and contribution
patterns of changing the system rules. Reducing the number of quar-
ters required to obtain the Minimum Pension and increasing the size
of that pension increases work in the formal sector and contributions
in the informal sector.
1 Introduction
The main goal of this study is to evaluate the effect of Chile’s pension sys-
tem rules on individuals’ pension contributions and working decisions. The
case of Chile is interesting because it was the first country to switch from
a pay-as-you-go system to a privatized system based on individual invest-
ment accounts. Since the reform in 1980, Chile’s pension system has been
a model for pension reforms in many other Latin American countries such
as Mexico, Argentina, Peru, Uruguay, etc. Moreover, this retirement system
has also been considered by U.S. policy makers as a model for a possible
reform. However, lately, the success of the Chilean pension system is being
questioned because more than half of the Chilean workforce is not currently
contributing. This is observed especially among the self-employed, for whom
contribution is voluntary. Therefore, improving the private pension system
is one of the main priorities of the government in Chile.
In Chile, as in most of the Latin American countries, the labor market is
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divided into two sectors: covered and uncovered. In general, the covered sec-
tor is where individuals sign a contract that provides them with employment
benefits (health care, housing plans, etc.) and obligations (payment of taxes
and fees, for instance).
The most fundamental characteristics of the pension system are that each
member of the new system has an individual account to which pension con-
tributions are paid. These accounts are managed by a Pension Fund Admin-
istrator (AFP) that charges commissions for its services. Member’s pensions
are financed with the resources accumulated in their individual accounts.
When the funds in the account are not enough to finance the minimum pen-
sion set by the government, the state guarantees the payment of the minimum
pension to members that fulfill the requirement of 20 years of contribution.
In March 2006, President Michelle Bachelet set up an independent commis-
sion of experts to study and propose improvements to the pension system. In
December 2006, the government passed some reform proposals to Congress
along the commission’s recommendations. One of the recommendations aims
to extend the state safety net. The commission proposed eliminating the re-
quirement of 20 years of contributions to obtain the minimum pension and
introducing a universal basic pension for the poorest. Another recommenda-
tion aimed to increase coverage by giving the self-employed the same rights
and responsibilities as those workers employed in the formal sector. This
means that contributions would gradually become obligatory.
Because individuals may adjust their decisions as the system rules change, it
is necessary to develop a model that is able to explain how individuals make
their labor market participation and contribution decisions. Accordingly we
develop and estimate a dynamic behavioral model of individual decisions
about labor participation and pension contributions in Chile. The model
also takes into account the fact that individuals working in different labor
sectors face different contribution rules. Among these rules is that member-
ship of the pension system is voluntary for the self-employed and uncovered
sector employees.
Most researchers who have developed dynamic models to analyze retirement
decisions have used data from the United States (see Rust and Phelan (1997)
and French (2003)). However this would not necessarily be a good representa-
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tion of how individuals would behave under a privatized retirement accounts
system in a developing country. The few empirical studies on the Chilean
Pension System have been limited to the use of aggregate and macro data
(see Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel (1995)). This paper’s contribution is to
analyze pension contribution patterns and employment decisions using mi-
cro data to evaluate alternative policy experiments. The estimated model
is used to simulate the impact on employment and contribution patterns of
modifications to the system rules, for example, of a change of the number of
years of contributions required to get a minimum pension or a change in the
commissions that are charged by the AFPs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the
related literature. Section 3 describes the Chilean Pension System. Sec-
tion 4 describes the data set and presents the descriptive statistics of the
sample used. Section 5 develops the dynamic behavioral model, explains the
model solution and the estimation method. The estimation results and model
goodness of fit are presented in Section 6. The policy experiment results are
presented in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This work builds on previous studies that develop and estimate dynamic
behavioral models for the purpose of studying how social security and pen-
sion rules affect labor supply and retirement behavior such as Gustman and
Steinmeier (1986), Rust and Phelan (1997), French (2002), and Van der
Klaauw and Wolpin (2005). These studies use data from individuals whose
retirement benefits are defined benefit not defined contribution. In a defined
benefit plan, the retirement benefits depend on age of retirement, an average
of the past earnings and years of service. In a defined contribution scheme,
such as that in Chile, the retirement benefits depend on contribution accu-
mulations.
An early paper by Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) develops and estimates
a life-cycle model that they use to study how social security and pension
benefits affect working and retirement behavior. Individuals may be working
full-time, be partially retired or fully retired. The model includes the fact
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that individuals in partial retirement obtain a lower wage rate than those
working full time. Once the model is estimated, it is used to simulate retire-
ment behavior. The simulations of the percentages of individuals who are
working full-time, partially retired, and fully retired are very similar to those
observed in the data, including the peaks in retirement percentages at age
62 and 65. These peaks are the result of the effect that social security and
pension benefits have on wages and therefore on retirement behavior. Their
paper was the first empirical study to treat each year as a separate period
for obtaining optimal labor supply paths over the entire life cycle. In this
paper, I also obtain these paths in order to examine how changes in retire-
ment benefits affect labor decisions of young individuals.
Rust and Phelan (1997) study how social security and Medicare affect retire-
ment behavior when some individuals do face borrowing constraints and do
not have access to annuities and health insurance. They develop and estimate
a dynamic programming model about individual decisions on labor supply
and application for social security benefits that incorporates constraints im-
posed by incomplete markets and allows for uncertainty in future earnings.
They find that the peak in retirement at 62 is explained by the borrowing
constraints and that the peak at 65 is explained by the incomplete markets
on annuities and health insurance and the facts that, for those older than
65, the social security benefit is unfair and Medicare is available only when
already applied for social security benefits. In my model I also introduce
uncertainty in future earnings and individuals are not allowed to save.
Most recent empirical analysis of how social security regulations affects retire-
ment behavior incorporate savings behavior and heterogeneity, for instance,
French (2002) and Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005). As opposed to the
earlier papers mentioned before, these authors use the estimated model to
conduct various policy experiments to evaluate not only the effects on labor
supply and retirement behavior of older workers but also on that of workers
younger than 62 years old. Changes on the size of social security benefits
and on the legal age of retirement are some of the policy experiments they
conduct. French (2002) finds that the effects of those changes on working de-
cisions of younger individuals are smaller than those of old workers. Van der
Klaauw and Wolpin (2005), who model the decisions of married and single
individuals, find that, in general, the behavior of singles is more affected by
those changes than that of married individuals. Although in my model I do
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not incorporate savings, I include heterogeneity. Also, as in the above two
papers, I am very interested in evaluating the behavior of young individuals.
The main difference between the models described above and the model I
develop here is that I model not only the labor supply decision, but also
the contribution decision. The model is estimated using micro data from
Chile. Most empirical studies of the Chilean pension system analyze ag-
gregate and macro data. For instance Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel (1995)
use an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth and formal-
informal production sectors to show how the privatization of the pension
system explains the increasing private savings and rising growth. The au-
thors suggest that switching from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully funded
system creates incentives to move employment to the more efficient formal
sector.
There are a few papers that use micro data, mostly for descriptive pur-
poses. Areanas de Mesa et. al. (2004) examine coverage of the Chilean
pension system. They use the 2002 round of the Historia Laboral y Seguri-
dad Social (HLLS ) survey to estimate the density of contributions, which is
calculated by adding the number of months of contributions since January
1980 and dividing it by the total number of months since January, 1980.
That paper concludes that the average density 52% of months, which implies
substantially lower replacement rates for representative individuals upon re-
tirement than would a hypothetical contribution density of 80% as assumed
in previous studies that forecast old-age pensions. In a subsequent paper,
Arenas de Mesa et. al. (2006) use the same data linking information on
contributions to the administrative records provided by the pension fund
regulatory agency, which are the same administrative data used in this pa-
per. They show that, over their lifetimes, men contribute more than women
and self-reported payments indicate higher contribution levels than those ob-
served in the contribution records. Also, they note that people usually do
not contribute during periods of unemployment or self-employment. They
also provide evidence that most workers know very little about the rules and
regulations of the pension system.
Following the findings in Arenas de Mesa et al (2004, 2006) I study the
Individual Account Chilean Pension System in order to design the best poli-
cies aimed at increasing contributions. Since contributions are low for self-
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employed, I evaluate the effect of changing the rules of the system on em-
ployment in the covered sector and uncovered sector.
3 The Chilean Pension System
The new Chilean Pension System known as the ”AFP system” is based on
individual capitalization. Each member of the system has an individual ac-
count where contributions are deposited. The accounts are managed by a
Pension Fund Administrator (AFP). The AFPs are competitive firms whose
purpose is to invest the pension funds in the capital market to provide to
their affiliates their corresponding retirement benefits. Each AFP must of-
fer five funds with different levels of risk, and therefore, different returns.
Members of the system may change from one AFP to another whenever they
want.2
For those members of the AFP system who are working it is mandatory
to pay the following monthly contributions calculated as a percentage of the
their taxable wage and other taxable income with an upper limit of 60 UF
3: 1) 10% for the pension fund, 2) 7% for health services, 3) around 0.8% to
finance the disability and survivorship insurance, and 4) around 1.6% for the
AFP expenses and profits. Besides the last two which together are called the
percentage commission, there is a fixed commission charged every month.
The commissions are set by each Administrator.
Pensions are financed with the resources accumulated in the individual ac-
count. If a member of the AFP system does not save enough to obtain a
pension equivalent to the minimum pension, the State finances the remain-
der provided the individual has accumulated 20 years of contribution by his
retirement age. The legal age of retirement is 65 for men and 60 for women.
Early retirement is allowed, provided that the retiree can obtain a pension
equal or greater than half his average earnings in the last 10 years and equal
or greater than 1.1 times the minimum pension guaranteed by the State.4
2There are currently six AFPs operating in Chile.
3The value of the UF as of December 2004 was $17,317 pesos (US$31)
4At retirement, a member can choose from three pension payout options: 1) pro-
grammed withdrawals, the member keeps his savings in his individual account and with-
draws annual amounts (in monthly payments). The AFP manages the account and recal-
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Membership of the AFP system is mandatory for those individuals in the
covered sector employed for the first time after January 1983 and voluntary
for the self-employed. Individuals that started working before January 1983
and belonged to the old pay-as-you-go system have the right, but not the
obligation, to switch systems. Workers who switch to the individual cap-
italization system obtain their Recognition Bond, an instrument issued by
the State that represents the contributions paid to the pay-as-you-go system.
The bond becomes payable when the legal age of retirement is reached and
it is deposited in the worker’s individual account. The pensions and contri-
butions of those that stayed in the old system are managed by the Institute
of Social Security Normalization (INP) which was created in 1980.
4 The Data
The Social Protection Survey (EPS) is a longitudinal data set that con-
tains information at the individual level on a representative sample of the
working-age population in Chile. The survey covers around 17,000 respon-
dents: 14,000 affiliated either with the pay-as-you-go system or the AFP sys-
tem at any time since 1981, and 3,000 not affiliated to any pension system.
The respondents were either working, unemployed, out of the labor force, or
officially retired. The survey contains information on affiliation status, em-
ployment history since 1980, pension contributions, retirement plan partici-
pation, savings, education, health, family background, family income, assets,
and capital. The first round of the survey was administered in 2002, and the
second one in 2004. The 2006 follow-up has been already administered and
an additional follow-up round is planned for 2008. Half of the respondents
are men. The most relevant information collected in the EPS survey for this
study is the retrospective data on employment, non-employment, and unem-
ployment spells, back to 1980.
culates the annual amount every year; 2) life annuity, the member purchases a life annuity
from a life insurance company where his savings are transferred. The Company promises
to make monthly payments until the death of the member; 3) temporary income with
deferred life annuity, the member keeps part of his savings in his individual account and
purchases a life annuity with the other part. He withdraws annual amounts until he starts
to receive the life annuity.
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The EPS information can be linked to administrative records on manda-
tory and voluntary monthly contributions, monthly wages, changes between
AFPs and delayed payments. There are also data on the value of the Recog-
nition Bond for those who switched systems and information on the type of
pension plan that retirees receive. For the purposes of this study, the most
important administrative information is the histories of monthly contribu-
tions and wages for those that contribute since January 1981. The 2002 and
2004 Social Protection Surveys linked to administrative records provide the
essential data base for studying the effect of the rules of the pension system
on employment and contribution decisions.
Because many women do not work in the paid labor market more than half
of the time, this study focuses on men. Moreover, the parameters of the
model will be estimated using only the information on men between 18 and
39 years old in 2004 for the following reasons: 1) it is assumed that men can
start contributing at 18, the age at which they should finish high school; 2)
membership of the AFP system is mandatory for those entering the work-
force for the first time after January 1983, then, it could be that men older
than 39 years old in 2004 contributed to the old pay-as-you-go system; and
3) there is no information on contributions paid to the old pension system.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
The sample used in the estimation of the model consists of 2,517 men between
18 and 39 years old in 2004 with an average age of 30.4 who, by 2004, already
finished their studies.5 Regarding the region of residence, 37.8% of them live
in the metropolitan area. The distribution of the individuals by education is
the following: 12.4% of them didn’t complete the basic education (8 years of
education), 32.6% have between 8 and 11 years of education, and 42.2% com-
pleted high school (12 years of education). The other 12.8% studied at least
one year of college. In average, they have 10.7 years of education. Regarding
marital and health status in 2004, 66.6% are already married and 9.3% have
been diagnosed with a chronic disease, such as diabetes, hypertension, etc.
Table 1 shows the socio-demographic characteristics of the sample.
5The education decision is not included in the model. Individuals enter the sample
once they finished studying
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Table 1: Socio-demographic Characteristics
Percentage
Residence in metropolitan area in 2004 37.8%
Bad health in 2004 9.3%
Married in 2004 66.6%
Mean Std. Dev.
Age in 2004 30.4 5.6
Years of education in 2004 10.7 3.0
As shown in Table 2, in average, individuals have worked 72.6% of their
time since they finished studying. From that percentage, 26.6% of the time
they worked in a covered sector job and the other 46.0% they worked in the
uncovered sector. The mean of annual earnings in the covered sector (2.2
million pesos) is higher than that in the uncovered sector (1.5 million pesos).
The density of contributions is defined as the percentage of quarters of con-
tribution of the total number of quarters elapsed since an individual finishes
his studies. The mean of the density of contributions at the beginning of the
year is only 30.3%. From that 30.3%, 26.5% corresponds to contributions
paid while working in the covered sector and the other 3.8% comes from
contributions while in the uncovered sector. Notice that while individuals
work in average 46.0% of the time in an uncovered job, they only contribute
voluntarily 3.8% of the time.
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Table 2: Labor and Contribution Statistics *
Labor sector participation Mean Std. Dev.
Working 72.6% 32.3%
Covered sector 26.6% 29.1%
Uncovered sector 46.0% 35.0%
Not working 27.4% 32.3%
Annual earnings in thousands of pesos**
Covered sector 2,225 1,723
Uncovered sector 1,534 1,243
Contribution to the pension
Density of contributions 30.3% 29.4%
Covered sector 26.6% 29.1%
Uncovered sector 3.8% 10.5%
* counting since they finished studying and until 2004
** 1,000 pesos = US$1.785, 2004 pesos
Tables 3 to 5 present average earnings, the average of accumulated quarters
of work and contributions, the average percentage of time working, and the
average density of contributions in both labor sectors by age groups. As
shown in Table 3, after-tax earnings in the covered sector are between 40%
and 50% greater than earnings in the uncovered sector for every group of
age.
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Table 3: Earnings in the Covered and Uncovered Sectors by Group
of Age *
Thousands of Pesos*
Covered Uncovered
Age Group Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
18-20 1,223 687 874 699
21-25 1,727 1,122 1,230 907
26-30 2,542 1,912 1,694 1,283
31-35 2,965 2,052 1,915 1,445
36-39 3,077 1,979 2,140 1,507
* counting since individuals finished studying and until 2004
** 1,000 pesos US$1.785, 2004 pesos
Table 4 shows that, although earnings are higher in the covered sector, the
proportion of time working in the uncovered sector is greater than that in
the covered sector for all groups of age. However, the difference between
these proportions decreases with age, with the youngest working 31.8% more
time in the uncovered sector and the oldest working only 14.8% more in that
sector. Notice that the group of individuals between 36 and 39 years old
have accumulated more than 65 quarters of work in both sectors. Had they
contributed every quarter, they needed only 15 quarters more of contribu-
tions to be eligible for the minimum pension. Nevertheless, this group of age
has accumulated only 31.3 quarters of contribution in average. The density
of contributions is very low for every group of age in the uncovered sector
where it is voluntary to contribute (see Table 5). It increases with age from
1.6% to only 5.5%.
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Table 4: Accumulated Quarters of Work and Percentage of Time
Working in the Covered and Uncovered Sectors by Group of Age*
Means
Age Group Covered Uncovered
18-20 0.5 8.5% 2.4 40.3%
21-25 4.2 21.3% 8.7 45.3%
26-30 12.2 33.5% 17.6 47.2%
31-35 20.9 38.2% 27.7 48.7%
36-39 27.3 37.5% 38.6 52.2%
*Counting since individuals finished studying
Table 5: Accumulated Quarters of Contribution and Density of Con-
tribution in the Covered and Uncovered Sectors by Group of Age*
Means
Age Group Covered Uncovered
18-20 0.5 8.5% 0.1 1.6%
21-25 4.2 21.3% 0.6 3.3%
26-30 12.2 33.5% 1.7 4.4%
31-35 20.9 38.2% 2.9 5.1%
36-39 27.3 37.5% 4.0 5.5%
*Counting since individuals finished studying
The dynamic model estimated incorporates the probabilities of getting mar-
ried and being diagnosed with a chronic disease that depend on age and
years of education. Table 6 presents the reduced form logit estimation of the
probability of getting married with age, age squared, years of education, and
years of education squared as independent variables. The estimated coeffi-
cients are significant at 5%. The probability of marriage increases with age
and years of education, although the positive relationship with age is stronger
than that with years of education. The relationship with the squared terms
is negative. Table 7 presents the reduced form logit estimation of the proba-
bility of being diagnosed with a chronic disease with age, years of education
and years of education squared as independent variables. Age has a positive
and significant effect on the probability of being in bad health. Years of ed-
ucation has a negative effect on this probability, although it is not significant.
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Table 6: Marriage Probability, Logit Estimates
Variable Parameter Std. Error
Constant* -15.186 0.944
Age* 0.960 0.075
Age squared* -0.018 0.0015
Years of education* 0.139 0.041
Years of education squared* -0.007 0.002
Observations 17,493
* significant at 5%
Table 7: Bad Health Probability, Logit Estimates
Variable Parameter Std. Error
Constant* -6.377 1.365
Age 0.004 0.137
Years of education -0.145 0.090
Years of education squared** 0.008 0.004
Observations 30,775
* significant at 5%
** significant at 10%
Wage offers in both the covered sector and the uncovered sector are also in-
corporated to the dynamic model. They depend on years of education, region
of residence, and years of work experience. Table 8 (9) presents the reduced
form OLS estimation of income in the covered (uncovered) sector using the
logarithm of annual after-tax income as dependent variable. Years of edu-
cation, and living in the metropolitan area have a positive and significant
effect on income in both sectors. In each sector, work experience of the same
sector has a higher effect on earnings than that experience in the other labor
sector. In the covered sector, years of work experience in that sector have a
positive effect on earnings while years of work experience in the uncovered
sector have a negative effect. In the uncovered sector, the effect of years of
work experience in that sector on earnings is twice as that of the years of
experience of the covered sector.
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Table 8: Log Earnings from Covered Sector Jobs, OLS Estimates
Variable Parameter Std. Error
Constant* 13.137 0.024
Years of education* 0.082 0.002
Region* 0.080 0.011
Tenure in covered sector* 0.034 0.0015
Tenure in covered sector squared* -0.0003 0.00002
Tenure in uncovered sector* -0.010 0.001
Tenure in uncovered sector squared* 0.0003 0.00002
Observations 13,711
* significant at 5%
Table 9: Log Earnings from Uncovered Sector Jobs, OLS Estimates
Variable Parameter Std. Error
Constant* 12.516 0.066
Years of education* 0.085 0.005
Region* 0.155 0.033
Tenure in covered sector* 0.011 0.003
Tenure in covered sector squared 0.0001 0.0001
Tenure in uncovered sector* 0.019 0.003
Tenure in uncovered sector squared* -0.0001 0.00004
Observations 4,740
* significant at 5%
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5 The Model
The model represents an individual’s decision problem regarding labor par-
ticipation and contribution to the pension. The model starts at the age the
individual finishes his studies ao and ends at age Ā = 85. The individual
makes decisions until retirement, at age A. At the beginning of each period
a ≤ A, that is, when the individual turns a years old, he receives wage of-
fers from both labor sectors, the covered sector and the uncovered sector,
and decides how many quarters to work, how many quarters not to work, or
retire. We define the covered sector as the one where workers have signed
employment contracts and pension contribution is compulsory, and the un-
covered sector where they do not have a signed contract or are self-employed
and it is optional to contribute to the pension. If the individual chooses to
work, he also decides whether to work in the covered or uncovered sector.
In the covered sector he has to contribute the same number of quarters he
works. In the uncovered sector, the contribution decision is also assumed to
be made by quarter: he has to decide how many quarters to contribute from
the quarters he works in this sector. Finally, it is assumed that an individual
does not contribute when not working.
Initial conditions of the model are: a) years of education, Eε{0, 1, ..., 18},
b) region of residence, Gε{0, 1}, which takes the value of 1 when the individ-
ual lives in the metropolitan area, c) previous health status, Hε{0, 1}, which
is 0 when good and 1 when bad, and d) previous marital status, Mε{0, 1},
which is 0 when single and 1 when married. The possible employment choices
at the beginning of each period at age a are the combinations of quarters of
work in a covered job, scaε{0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, quarters of work in an uncovered job,
suaε{0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, or retirement, raε{0, 1}. At retirement the model ends, so
retirement, ra = 1, is an absorbing state. As mentioned before, in the covered
sector, it is mandatory to contribute to the pension; in this case the number
of quarters of contribution equals the number of quarters of work in a covered
sector job, qca = s
c
a. The maximum number of possible contribution periods
in the uncovered sector is the number of quarters of work in an uncovered
sector job, qua 5 sua.
The individual’s utility function, at each age a , is given by:
Ua = U(Ca, la, s
u
a; Ma, Ha, ε
C
a , ε
l
a, µ) (1)
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where Ca represents the individual’s consumption at age a. The individual
obtains non-pecuniary utility from quarters not working and for quarters
working in the uncovered sector, laε{0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and suaε{0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, respec-
tively. The utility also depends on marital status, Maε{0, 1}, and health
status, Haε{0, 1}. The terms εCa , εla are age-varying shocks to the marginal
utilities of consumption and leisure. The term µ is a vector of unobserved
individual-specific factors that affect his preferences for consumption and
time working.
Consumption at age a < A is equal to earnings minus contributions in case
the individual works, or an unemployment benefit otherwise. At ages a = A
it equals the pension:
Ca =
{
sca
wca
4
[1− (τ + φ)] + wua
4
[sua − qua(τ + φ)] + CMI(la = 4), ∀a < A;
Pa, ∀a ≥ A,
(2)
where wca is annual earnings paid to the covered worker, w
u
a is annual earn-
ings paid to the uncovered worker, and b is the unemployment benefit the
worker receives when he does not work that year.6 The contribution rate is
10% of taxable earnings, τ = 0.1. The average fees and commissions that
AFPs charge per year are represented by φ.
In any period a, an individual may have either good health, Ha = 0, or
bad health, Ha = 1. The individual has good health until diagnosed with a
chronic disease. He observes his health status at the beginning of the period.
The probability of being diagnosed with a chronic disease that year depends
on age, years of education, and previous health status:
πHa = π
H(a,E; Ha−1 = 0, µ), (3)
where µ is a vector of unobserved individual-specific factors that affect the
probability of having a chronic disease. For the health status only chronic
diseases are taken into account, so poor health is an absorbing state.
Regarding marital status, the individual can be married, Ma = 1, or sin-
gle, Ma = 0. It is assumed that once an individual gets married he stays
6Incorporating savings other than the pension contributions greatly increases the com-
plexity of the estimation problem. Moreover, few people report other types of savings in
the data.
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married. The probability of getting married at the beginning of the period
depends on age, years of education, and previous marital status:
πMa = π
M(a,E; Ma−1 = 0, µ), (4)
where µ is a vector of unobserved individual-specific factors that affect the
probability of getting married.
Wage offers are sector-specific, wj, where j = c is covered and j = u is
uncovered. The wage offer for an individual at age a is:
wja = ρ
jKja(E,G, T
j
a , T
−j
a , ε
j
a; µ), (5)
where ρj is a sector-specific skill rental price, and Kja is the individual’s stock
of human capital at age a that varies with the job market sector. The individ-
ual accumulates capital through years of work experience. The cumulative
years worked in the sector j up to age a is represented by T ja (tenure). ε
j
a is
an age-varying shock that differs by sector and µ is a vector of unobserved
individual-specific factors that affect wage offers. Denote by Wa = [w
c
a, w
u
a ]
the vector that includes the wage offers received by an individual at the be-
ginning of period a.
Pensions are financed with the funds accumulated in the individual accounts
where pension contributions are deposited,
Pa =
Ba
factor(a,Ma)
, (6)
where Ba is the account balance at the end of period a, and factor(a,Ma)
is an annuity factor that depends on age and marital status. The account
balance at the end of the period a is Ba = (Ba−1 + Γa) (1 + R), where Γa is
the amount of contributions during period a, and R represents the average
annual rate of return of the pension fund which varies every year. The
expected annual rate of return is E[R] = κ, then
R = κ + εR, (7)
where εR is an annual-varying shock.
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When the funds in the account are insufficient to finance the minimum pen-
sion set by the government, PM = US$110, the state guarantees the payment
of the minimum pension to members that fulfill the requirement of 20 years
of contribution (80 quarters). Denote by Qa the number of quarters of con-
tributions at the end of period a. The legal retirement age for men is 65
years old, but retirees have the option to take early retirement provided that
the pension is higher than half the average earnings in the last 10 years, W a,
and higher than 1.1 times the minimum pension.
Individuals who are not members of any pension system have the right to get
a basic pension, called PASIS 7, that is financed by the government. To be
eligible to get the PASIS the individual has to be at least 65 years old and
to have an income lower than the minimum pension. The size of the PASIS
is half of the minimum pension.
The state variables at age a are the initial conditions of the model plus
age, year, previous marital status, previous health status, years of work ex-
perience, tenure, quarters of contribution, balance in the individual account,
and the vector of shocks εa. Denote the state space at age a by Ωa,
Ωa =
{
a, E, G, Ma−1, Ha−1, T ca , T
u
a , Qa, Ba,W a, εa
}
. (8)
The age-varying shocks to consumption, leisure, the wage offer in the cov-
ered sector, the wage offer in the uncovered sector, and the rate of return are
assumed to be iid with mean zero and jointly normally distributed, f(ε(a)),
and jointly serially uncorrelated.8 Additionally, the vector of unobserved
individual-specific factors, µ has a distribution function z(µ) and is assumed
to be independently distributed from the vector of stochastic shocks.
The functional forms for the utility, the wage offers, and the probabilities
of being in bad health and of getting married are presented in Appendix A.
7PASIS stands for Pension Asistencial
8There are also implicit shocks to the probabilities of marriage and bad health, which
are assumed to be independently distributed from the explicit shocks considered.
19
5.1 Model Solution
Each period a ≤ A, the individual has to choose one of the mutually ex-
clusive available options k ∈ Ka, which are the combinations of labor and
contribution decisions or retirement. The individual’s optimization problem
can be represented in value function form:
V (Ωa, a) = max
k∈Ka
E
(
Ā∑
τ=a
δτ−a(1−D(τ))τ−aUk(τ)|Ωa
)
, (9)
where δ is the discount factor and D is the probability of dying next period.
This problem can be stated in a dynamic programming form using the Bell-
man equation representation:
V (Ωa, a) = max
k∈Ka
V k(Ωa, a), (10)
where the right-hand side represents the maximization over alternative-specific
value functions. These value functions are given by:
V k(Ωa, a) =
{
Uk(a, Ωa) + δE (V (Ωa+1, a + 1)|k, Ωa), ∀a < A;
Uk(A, ΩA) + E
(∑Ā
τ=A+1 δ
τ−a(1−D(τ))τ−aU(τ)|ΩA
)
, a = A.
(11)
The model is solved by backwards recursion, starting from the last period
the individual makes decisions, A, to the initial period a0. It is assumed that
by 70 years old everyone retires. The terminal value is the discounted value
of the remaining lifetime utility which depends on the pension and therefore
on the state space at age of retirement.9 At period A − 1 the individual
chooses the option that maximizes his period utility plus the terminal value
given the state space ΩA−1. Then at period A − 2, he calculates the alter-
native value functions using the distribution of the shocks at period A − 1,
for every option and every point in the state space, that is, the expected
value next period A − 1 given the decision k ∈ KA−2 and every state point
in ΩA−2. This is called the Emax function by Keane and Wolpin (1994, 1997).
The model does not have a closed-form solution, only a numerical one. It is
not possible to calculate the expected value for every point in the state space
9It is assumed that individuals discount their utility until they are 85 years old. This
assumption has no effect on the results but provides important computational time savings.
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given its size both due to the number of variables it contains and because
some of the state variables are continuous. The value of the Emax function is
approximated using a method proposed in Keane and Wolpin (1994, 1997).
The values computed at a subset of points of the state space are used to
approximate the Emax function by a polynomial in the state variables. To
calculate the expected value it is necessary to do a multivariate integration
of dimension 5, that is, to integrate over the shocks. Because the Emax func-
tion calculation implies a multivariate integration, Monte Carlo integration
has to be performed.10
5.2 Model Estimation
The parameters of the model are estimated using the Simulated Maximum
Likelihood method. The likelihood for a sample of I individuals is the prod-
uct of the I probabilities of the outcomes being observed each period up
to an age, given the initial conditions and the unobserved heterogeneity of
each individual. The observed outcomes include the following: a) the choice
k that is a combination of labor and contribution decisions, b) the health
status H that can be bad or good, c) the marital status M that can be single
or married, d) the wage offers {wc, wu} received form each sector, and e) the
annual rate of return R. The vector of outcomes at period a is represented
by Oa = {ka, Ha,Ma, wca, wua , Ra}. The vector of initial conditions is the
state space at period a0 denoted by Ωa0 . Assume that the individual-specific
unobserved characteristics identifies 2 types of individuals in the popula-
tion, µ1 and µ2. Then, heterogeneity is represented by the vector of types
µ = {µ1, µ2}.
The likelihood for the sample of I individuals observed from their initial
period ai0 to period â
i is
I∏
i=1
P
(
Oâi , Oâi−1, ..., Oai0|Ωai0 , µ
)
. (12)
Since the type is known by the individual but unobserved by the econometri-
cian, it is integrated out. Also, because the initial conditions are exogenous
10The model is solved using 2,600 state space points and 100 draws for the shocks.
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conditional on type, the sample likelihood becomes:
I∏
i=1
2∑
t=1
{
P
(
Oâi , Oâi−1, ..., Oai0|Ωai0 , µt
)
× P
(
µt|Ωai0
)}
, (13)
where P
(
µt|Ωai0
)
is the probability of individual i of being of type t. These
type probabilities are functions of the initial conditions and are also esti-
mated.
A difficulty that has to be considered in calculating the likelihood is that
some of the wages are missing in the data. This problem is solved by inte-
grating out over all possible wages.
Due to the shocks’ serial independence assumption, the probability of ob-
serving the outcomes up to some age given the initial conditions and the
type t for an individual i can be written as:
P
(
Oâi|Ωâi , µt
)
P
(
Oâi−1|Ωâi−1, µt
)
...P
(
Oai0|Ωai0 , µt
)
. (14)
The following example shows how how the conditional probabilities are com-
puted. Consider some available option ka for the i−th individual at age
a. Assume that the individual ends the current period in good health and
single. The option ka consists of the individual working in a covered sector
job for 2 quarters, working in an uncovered sector job for 1 quarter and not
contributing, and taking a quarter of leisure. Then, the observed output
includes both wages, the annual rate of return, and the marriage and health
status. The conditional probability of observing the described outcome is:
P
(
ka = 1, w
c
a, w
u
a , Ra, Ha = 0,Ma = 0|Ωa, µt
)
=
P
(
wca, w
u
a , Ra, Ha = 0,Ma = 0|ka = 1, Ωa, µt
)×
P
(
ka = 1|Ωa, µt
)
,
where the first term in the second row of the equation is the joint density
of both sectors’ wages, the rate of return, the marital status, and the health
status, conditional on choosing option ka, the state space at period a, and the
individual’s type. The second term is the probability of choosing option ka
conditional on the state space at age a and the individual’s type. Then, the
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likelihood contribution at age a for individual i can be rewritten as follows:
P
(
ka = 1, w
c
a, w
u
a , Ra, Ha = 0,Ma = 0|Ωa, µt
)
=∫
ε
f
(
wca, w
u
a , Ra, Ha = 0,Ma = 0|ka = 1, Ωa, µt
)×
P
(
ka = 1|Ωa, µt
)
dε,
where the integral above is taken over the vector of shocks, ε. The first
term on the right-hand side is obtained from the distributional assumptions
made for the shocks. The second term, can be computed using a smoothed
frequency simulator such as the following: 1) for each one of V draws of the
shocks’ vector, compute
exp
(
V k
∗
(a)−max
k
(V k(a))
τ
)
∑
j
exp
(
V i(a)−max
k
(V k(a))
τ
) , (15)
where τ is a smoothing parameter chosen such that it provides enough
smoothing given the magnitudes of the value functions computed;11 this ker-
nel represents the probability of choosing option k∗, conditional on the state
space and the individual’s type; 2) integrate over the V draws of the vector
of shocks.
The maximization of the likelihood function iterates between the solution
of the model and the computation of the likelihood function. Because the
available options and choices in the model are discrete, we require the use of
a maximization algorithm that does not make use of first order conditions
such as a simplex method. The identification of the parameters in the model
is obtained from the combination of exclusion restrictions and the functional
forms assumed.
11In the estimation procedure, the smoothing parameter τ is set equal to 10,000. 100
draws are used to perform the numerical integration.
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6 Estimation Results and Model Fit
6.1 Parameter Estimates
The functional forms for the utility, the wage offers, and the probabilities of
being in bad health and of getting married are presented in Appendix A. The
estimates and standard errors of the 51 estimated parameters are shown in
Appendix B.
6.2 Model Goodness of Fit and Base-Line Model Statis-
tics
This section presents the model’s goodness of fit to the data. It should be
reminded that the data used in the estimation procedure includes data for
men at ages 18-39 only. In this section some simulations of the decisions for
individuals at later ages are also shown as a way of presenting the baseline
model used in the policy experiments in Section 7.
Using the estimated parameters it is possible to observe that the model fits
the data quite well in several dimensions. Tables 10 to 14 compare the model
and the data regarding several statistics of interest. Table 10 presents the
comparison of the average number of quarters of work per sector by groups of
age. The model predicts quarters of work very well, although the predictions
are slightly higher than those observed in the data for the covered sector and
slightly lower than those observed for the uncovered sector. For age groups
starting at 40 years old, only simulated data are available.
Table 11 shows how the model fits the data on accepted annual wages
by sector. As can be observed, the model predicts average annual earnings
slightly higher in the uncovered sector than those observed in the data. For
two of the three groups of age, the predictions are slightly higher than those
observed and lower in the other group.
The model fits the patterns of accumulated quarters of contribution in
the uncovered sector fairly well. However, the simulated accumulations for
old ages are constant in that sector. In the case of the covered sector, the
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Table 10: Accumulated Quarters of Work in the Covered and Un-
covered Sectors
Data/Simulated
Covered Uncovered
Age Group
(mean) (mean)
18-25 3.1/3.9 6.8/6.5
26-32 13.7/14.7 19.2/18.2
33-39 24.4/27.9 33.3/31.0
40-44 – /39.3 – /42.1
45-49 – /48.6 – /51.1
50-54 – /57.3 – /59.9
55-59 – /65.4 – /68.5
60-64 – /72.7 – /76.8
65-69 – /79.0 – /84.0
model predicts slightly higher accumulations than those observed in the data.
Table 13 shows the model’s fit of the proportion of married men. The
model predicts very well this proportion for the first two groups of age. The
difference in the third group of age is small.
The model predicts a slightly higher proportion of men in bad health for
the third group of age than that observed in the data, although the difference
is small. In the other groups the predicted probability is the same as in the
data (see Table 14).
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Table 11: Accepted Annual Wages in the Covered and Uncovered
Sectors
Data/Simulated
Covered Uncovered
Age Group
(mean) (mean)
18-25 1,640,718/1,648,139 1,124,914/1,340,707
26-32 2,675,647/2,378,733 1,724,703/1,917,354
33-39 3,039,368/3,230,492 1,993,377/2,251,030
40-44 – /3,775,020 – /2,529,600
45-49 – /3,992,639 – /2,728,268
50-54 – /4,056,046 – /2,883,663
55-59 – /3,981,479 – /3,010,349
60-64 – /3,843,688 – /3,101,069
65-69 – /4,305,409 – /2,663,775
Table 12: Accumulated Quarters of Contribution in the Covered
and Uncovered Sectors
Data/Simulated
Covered Uncovered
Age Group
(mean) (mean)
18-25 3.1/3.9 0.4/1.0
26-32 13.7/14.7 1.8/2.3
33-39 24.4/27.9 3.4/2.9
40-44 – /39.3 – /3.1
45-49 – /48.6 – /3.1
50-54 – /57.3 – /3.1
55-59 – /65.4 – /3.1
60-64 – /72.7 – /3.1
65-69 – /79.0 – /3.1
26
Table 13: Proportion of Married Men
Data/Simulated
Married
Age Group
(mean)
18-25 0.28/0.28
26-32 0.70/0.70
33-39 0.85/0.83
40-44 –/0.84
45-49 –/0.84
50-54 –/0.84
55-59 –/0.84
60-64 –/0.84
65-69 –/0.84
Table 14: Proportion of Men in Bad Health
Data/Simulated
In bad health
Age Group
(mean)
18-25 0.02/0.02
26-32 0.05/0.05
33-39 0.08/0.09
40-44 –/0.17
45-49 –/0.26
50-54 –/0.40
55-59 –/0.58
60-64 –/0.76
65-69 –/0.90
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7 Counterfactual Policy Experiments
7.1 Minimum Pension
The Minimum Pension Program is a welfare program sponsored by the gov-
ernment. It is provided to those members of the AFP system who are at
least 65 years old (60 for women) and do not save enough in their individual
accounts to obtain the current minimum pension set by the government. The
State guarantees to finance the difference between the minimum pension and
the pension obtained with the savings accumulated in the individual account
provided 20 years of contributions. In January 2004, the minimum pension
annual benefit was approximately $860,000 pesos.
This program was created in 1980 when the pay-as-you-go pension system in
Chile was replaced by an individual capitalization system. Nowadays, after
25 years of operation, this system is facing some challenges, for instance, a
low density of contributions. In a recent study, Arenas de Mesa et al (2006)
found that people mostly do not contribute during periods of unemployment
and self-employment. It is more likely that poor people face more periods of
unemployment and then they will not be able to obtain a minimum pension
if they do not fulfill the requirement of 20 years of contributions.
In order to provide the poor with a minimum pension in their old-age, the
Chilean government proposed eliminating the requirement of 20 years of con-
tributions for the poor. At the beginning of 2008 the Congress approved
the proposed reform to the pension system regarding the minimum pension.
Starting July 2008 the fixed minimum pension benefit was switched for a
graduated minimum pension benefit called the Aporte Previsional Solidario
de Vejez (APS). It is a complement to the pension obtained with the re-
sources accumulated in the individual account that the State guarantees to
finance. The size of the APS depends on the size of the contributory pension
that each member can get, the larger the contributory pension the larger
the APS. This complement will be provided to those members of the AFP
system who fulfill only two requirements: to be at least 65 years old (60 for
women) and to have a contributory pension lower than the Pension Máxima
con Aporte Solidario, which is a maximum pension set by the government.
It is of policy interest to asses the impact of changing the rules regarding
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the Minimum Pension benefit. The estimated model developed in this study
is used to evaluate the impact on employment and contribution patterns of
changes in the Minimum Pension rules similar to those already approved
by the Congress at the beginning of this year. Individual decisions on labor
participation and contribution to the pension are simulated under alternative
scenarios.
7.1.1 Years of contributions required to get the Minimum Pension
I study the effect of changes in the quarters of contributions required to be
eligible to obtain the Minimum pension. Table 15 compares the simulated
accumulated quarters of work in both sectors for three different numbers of
years required to be eligible to obtain the minimum pension: 80 (baseline),
60 and 40. There is a higher effect of these changes on work decisions of
young people than on those of old people. For instance, on the one hand,
the number of accumulated quarters of covered work for those at ages 18-25
increases from 3.9 to 4.1 when the requirement goes down to 60 quarters and
from 3.9 to 4.3 when the requirement is 40 quarters. On the other hand, the
accumulated quarters of work in the covered sector for those ages 60-64 in-
creases only from 72.7 to 73.7 and from 72.7 to 75.2 respectively. Therefore,
decreasing the number of quarters of contributions required to get the mini-
mum pension from 80 to 60, that is, by 25%, increases work of the youngest
group of individuals in the covered sector by 5% and when that requirement
is lowered from 80 to 40 quarters, that is 50% lower, their work increases 10%.
According to the simulations, the number of quarters of work in the uncov-
ered sector does not decrease as much as it increases in the covered sector,
which implies that it is not the case that people switch from the uncovered
sector to the covered one. Part of the effect is explained by the fact that those
individuals that stay at home in the baseline choose to work instead in the
covered sector when the requirement of quarters of contributions decreases.
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Table 15: Accumulated Quarters of Work in the Covered and Un-
covered Sectors
Required Quarters 80 60 40
of Contributions
Baseline
Age Group Cov Uncov Cov Uncov Cov Uncov
18-25 3.9 6.5 4.1 6.5 4.3 6.5
26-32 14.7 18.2 15.2 18.0 15.8 17.8
33-39 27.9 31.0 28.7 30.6 29.6 30.1
40-44 39.3 42.1 40.2 41.5 41.4 40.8
45-49 48.6 51.1 49.6 50.4 50.9 49.6
50-54 57.3 59.9 58.4 59.2 59.8 58.3
55-59 65.4 68.5 66.4 67.8 67.9 66.9
60-64 72.7 76.8 73.7 76.2 75.2 75.3
65-69 79.0 84.0 79.6 82.9 80.4 81.6
Table 16 shows the effect of changing the number of quarters required
to get the minimum pension on contributions. Because it is mandatory to
contribute while working in the covered sector, the effect on contributions in
the covered sector is the same as the one described above for work in that
sector. The effect on contributions in the uncovered sector for young people
is interesting because even when work in that sector decreases, the quarters
of contributions are a lot higher. When the requirement changes from 80 to
60 quarters, there is an increase of more than 30% and when it changes to 40
quarters, accumulated contributions increase by more than 70%. Although
the number of quarters of contributions in the uncovered sector is small, a
change in the number of quarters required to get the minimum pension af-
fects the contribution decision importantly.
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Table 16: Accumulated Quarters of Contributions in the Covered
and Uncovered Sectors
Required Quarters 80 60 40
of Contributions
Baseline
Age Group Cov Uncov Cov Uncov Cov Uncov
18-25 3.9 1.0 4.1 1.3 4.3 1.7
26-32 14.7 2.3 15.2 3.1 15.8 4.0
33-39 27.9 2.9 28.7 4.1 29.6 5.4
40-44 39.3 3.1 40.2 4.4 41.4 6.0
45-49 48.6 3.1 49.6 4.5 50.9 6.1
50-54 57.3 3.1 58.4 4.5 59.8 6.1
55-59 65.4 3.1 66.4 4.5 67.9 6.1
60-64 72.7 3.1 73.7 4.5 75.2 6.1
65-69 79.0 3.1 79.6 4.5 80.4 6.1
7.1.2 Size of the Minimum Pension
In order to measure the impact of changing the size of the Minimum Pension
on employment and contribution decisions, first I increase it by 25% from
$800, 000 pesos to $1, 000, 000 pesos and then by 50% to 1, 200, 000 pesos. In
these policy experiments it is still required to have 80 quarters of contribu-
tions to be eligible to get the minimum pension.
The results about the effect on accumulated quarters of work are presented
in Table 17. Work in the covered sector increases when the size of the mini-
mum pension is higher, specially for young men. By ages 33-39 an individual
has accumulated 2.8 more quarters of work in the covered sector when the
minimum pension increases 25% and 7.9 more quarters when the minimum
pension is 50% higher. Work in the uncovered sector decreases although the
effect is not as high.
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Table 17: Accumulated Quarters of Work in the Covered and Un-
covered Sectors
Size of the Minimum $800,000 $1,000,000 $1,200,000
Pension in pesos
Baseline
Age Group Cov Uncov Cov Uncov Cov Uncov
18-25 3.9 6.5 4.7 6.5 6.3 6.5
26-32 14.7 18.2 16.6 17.5 20.1 16.7
33-39 27.9 31.0 30.7 29.7 35.8 27.6
40-44 39.3 42.1 42.6 40.3 48.8 37.4
45-49 48.6 51.1 52.1 49.1 58.8 45.9
50-54 57.3 59.9 60.9 57.9 67.7 54.6
55-59 65.4 68.5 68.8 66.6 75.6 63.4
60-64 72.7 76.8 76.1 75.0 82.6 71.9
65-69 79.0 84.0 81.9 81.8 87.9 78.2
The accumulated quarters of contributions in the uncovered sector in-
crease steadily for young individuals as observed in Table 18. At ages 33-39
a worker accumulates 4.6 more quarters of contributions when the size of the
minimum pension increases 25% and when it increases 50% an individual
accumulates 13.7 more quarters of contributions. In the last case, the accu-
mulation of contributions is almost 5 times higher than in the baseline.
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Table 18: Accumulated Quarters of Contributions in the Covered
and Uncovered Sectors
Size of the Minimum $800,000 $1,000,000 $1,200,000
Pension in pesos
Baseline
Age Group Cov Uncov Cov Uncov Cov Uncov
18-25 3.9 1.0 4.7 2.3 6.3 4.4
26-32 14.7 2.3 16.6 5.5 20.1 11.1
33-39 27.9 2.9 30.7 7.5 35.8 16.6
40-44 39.3 3.1 42.6 8.3 48.8 19.8
45-49 48.6 3.1 52.1 8.6 58.8 21.9
50-54 57.3 3.1 60.9 8.6 67.7 21.9
55-59 65.4 3.1 68.8 8.6 75.6 21.9
60-64 72.7 3.1 76.1 8.6 82.6 21.9
65-69 79.0 3.1 81.9 8.6 87.9 22.0
7.2 Commissions
In addition to the 10% of the taxable income that members pay as monthly
contributions, they have to pay for health insurance and commissions. The
level of the commissions is set by each AFP. Currently the approximated
average percentage commission is 2.5% of taxable income. From that 2.5%,
0.85 percentage points are used to finance the disability and survivorship in-
surance, and the other 1.65 percentage points cover the AFPs’ administrative
costs and profits. pesos.
In the 1980s, the level of the percentage commission was around 3.5%, and it
decreased until it reached around 2.5% in 2004. People in Chile still complain
about the high commissions charged by the AFPs. For this reason, when the
president Michelle Bachelet appointed a commission of experts to study the
possible reforms to the pension system, some of the points to discuss were to
lower the administrative fees and to boost competitiveness among AFPs.
According to the reforms to the pension system that the Congress approved
at the beginning of 2008, the new members of the system will be automati-
cally affiliated to the AFP that charges the lowest fees. These will increase
the economic competitiveness among AFPs and will lower the percentage
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commission.
In order to asses the impact of changing commissions on employment and
contributions, I will use the estimated model to study the effect of lowering
the commission from 2.5% to 2.0% and then to 1.5%. As can be observed
in Table 19 the effect on work decisions of changes in commissions is very
small. There is a positive effect on work in the covered sector but even by
decreasing fees by 1% the increase in accumulated quarters of covered work
is lower than 1 quarter. On the contrary, the effect in the uncovered sector
is negative but of the same magnitude as that in the covered sector.
Table 19: Accumulated Quarters of Work in the Covered and Un-
covered Sectors
Percentage Commission 2.5% 2.0% 1.5%
Baseline
Age Group Cov Uncov Cov Uncov Cov Uncov
18-25 3.9 6.5 4.0 6.5 4.0 6.5
26-32 14.7 18.2 14.7 18.1 14.8 18.1
33-39 27.9 31.0 28.1 30.9 28.2 30.7
40-44 39.3 42.1 39.6 41.8 39.8 41.6
45-49 48.6 51.1 48.9 50.8 49.2 50.5
50-54 57.3 59.9 57.7 59.6 58.0 59.2
55-59 65.4 68.5 65.7 68.1 66.1 67.8
60-64 72.7 76.8 73.1 76.4 73.5 76.0
65-69 79.0 84.0 79.4 83.6 79.8 83.2
As Table 20 shows when lowering the percentage commission there is a
very small positive effect on accumulated contributions. Although small, that
effect on contributions in the uncovered sector is higher for young individuals
when the commission is decreased from 2.5% to 1.5%.
34
Table 20: Accumulated Quarters of Contributions in the Covered
and Uncovered Sectors
Percentage Commission 2.5% 2.0% 1.5%
Baseline
Age Group Cov Uncov Cov Uncov Cov Uncov
18-25 3.9 1.0 4.0 1.1 4.0 1.7
26-32 14.7 2.3 14.7 2.5 14.8 2.6
33-39 27.9 2.9 28.1 3.1 28.2 3.4
40-44 39.3 3.1 39.6 3.3 39.8 3.6
45-49 48.6 3.1 48.9 3.4 49.2 3.7
50-54 57.3 3.1 57.7 3.4 58.0 3.7
55-59 65.4 3.1 65.7 3.4 66.1 3.7
60-64 72.7 3.1 73.1 3.4 73.5 3.7
65-69 79.0 3.1 79.4 3.4 79.8 3.7
8 Conclusions
Since most pension systems around the world are having financial problems,
studying them is one of the main priorities of the governments in every
country. The Chilean Pension System has received much attention from re-
searchers and policy makers because Chile was the first country that switched
from a pay-as-you-go pension system to a private one based on individual
capitalization. In the new system contributions are deposited in individual
accounts that are managed by the Pension Funds Managers (AFPs). The
success of the AFP system is being questioned because more than half of
the workforce is not currently contributing, especially the self-employed, for
whom contribution is voluntary, and the young workers, who stay at home
or work in the uncovered sector. Therefore, at the beginning of this year, in
order to increase coverage and extend the state safety net, the AFP system
was reformed.
In order to understand how the reforms to the Individual Account Pension
System affect contributions, I develop a dynamic behavioral model of individ-
ual employment and contribution decisions. Although the low contribution
problem for these kind of pension systems has been studied before, this is
the first structural model that takes into account that individuals working in
different labor market sectors face different contribution rules. In the covered
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sector it is mandatory to contribute to the pension while in the uncovered
sector it is voluntary. Then, using the estimated structural model it is possi-
ble to measure how individuals change their work and contribution decisions
as the characteristics of the system change. Because the rules regarding the
state minimum benefits are also included in the model, I asses the impact of
changing those rules on employment and contribution.
I conduct two kinds of policy experiments regarding the Minimum Pension:
1) lower the number of quarters of contributions required to obtain the mini-
mum pension guaranteed by the State and 2) increase the size of the minimum
pension. These changes are similar to those reforms already approved by the
Chilean Congress in January 2008. The effect of these changes in the rules is
more pronounced on the decisions of young individuals, especially for those
younger than 40 years old.
For those young individuals, when the required number of quarters of contri-
butions is decreased by 25%, the accumulated number of quarters of work in
the covered sector increases between 3 and 5% and the accumulated quarters
of contributions increase between 30 and 40%. Moreover, when that required
number is decreased by 50%, covered work increases between 6 and 10% and
accumulated contributions paid while in the uncovered sector increase be-
tween 70 and 85%. The effect on contributions while in the covered sector
is exactly the same as that on covered work because it is mandatory to con-
tribute there.
With respect to the second kind of experiments and for the same group
of young individuals, when the size of the minimum pension is increased
by 25%, the accumulated quarters of work in the covered sector increase
between 10 and 20% and accumulated quarters of contributions in the un-
covered sector increase more than 100%. The impact of increasing the size of
the minimum pension by 50% is even higher. Accumulated quarters of work
in the covered sector increase between 30 and 60% and accumulated quarters
of contribution in the uncovered sector increase by around 4 times.
Two of the main goals of reforming the Chilean Individual Account Pension
System were to increase contribution in the informal sector and to encour-
age labor market participation of young people. According to the results of
the policy experiments, both reducing the quarters of contributions required
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to get the minimum pension and increasing the size of that pension have a
positive effect both on work in the covered sector and on contributions in the
uncovered sector.
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10 Appendix A: Functional Forms
Utility Function
Ua =
C
2P
h=1
I(type=h)θh1
a
2∑
h=1
I(type = h)θh1
[
1 + exp
(
θ2la + θ3Ma + θ4Ha + θ5ε
C
a
)]
+θ6la+θ7laMa+θ8laHa+θ10s
u
a+θ9ε
l
a
(16)
Wage Function in Covered Sector
ln(wca) =
2∑
h=1
I(type = h)γh1 +γ2a+γ3a
2+γ4E+γ5E
2+γ6G+γ7T
c
a+γ8(T
c
a)
2+γ9Xa+γ10X
2
a+γ11ε
c
a
(17)
Wage Function in Uncovered Sector
ln(wua) =
2∑
h=1
I(type = h)ξh1 +ξ2a+ξ3a
2+ξ4E+ξ5E
2+ξ6G+ξ7T
u
a +ξ8(T
u
a )
2+ξ9Xa+ξ10X
2
a+ξ11ε
u
a
(18)
Probability of Getting Married (Ma = 1)
πMa =
2∑
h=1
I(type = h)αh1 + α2a + α3a
2 + α4E + α5E
2 (19)
Probability of Being in Bad Health (Ha = 1)
πHa =
2∑
h=1
I(type = h)βh1 + β2a + β3a
2 + β4E + β5E
2 (20)
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11 Appendix B: Estimates
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Table 21: Estimates: Part 1
Utility function Mean Std. Error
CRRA parameter type 1 0.5 .
CRRA parameter type 2 0.5 .
Consumption*leisure 0.2 .
Consumption*bad health -0.08 .
Shock to consumption 0.1 .
Leisure 70.0 .
Leisure for young 70.0 .
Leisure*single 574.1 .
Leisure*bad health 400.0 .
Shock to leisure 0.1 .
Non-pecuniary term for work in the uncovered sector 0.3 .
Wage Offer in the Covered Sector Mean Std. Error
Constant type 1 12.8 .
Constant type 2 12.3 .
Years of education 0.08 .
Region of residence 0.07 .
Years of work exp. in the covered sector 0.033 .
Years of work exp. in the covered sector squared -0.00023 .
Years of work exp. in the uncovered sector 0.0028 .
Years of work exp. in the uncovered sector squared -0.000025 .
Wage Offer in the Uncovered Sector Mean Std. Error
Constant type 1 11.7 .
Constant type 2 11.8 .
Years of education 0.08 .
Region of residence 0.1 .
Years of work exp. in the covered sector 0.0001 .
Years of work exp. in the covered sector squared -0.00001 .
Years of work exp. in the uncovered sector 0.024 .
Years of work exp. in the uncovered sector squared -0.00014 .
27.4% .
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Table 22: Estimates: Part 2
Probability of getting married Mean Std. Error
Constant type 1 -15.2 .
Constant type 2 -15.3 .
Age 0.9 .
Age squared -0.018 .
Years of education 0.1 .
Years of education squared -0.007 .
Probability of being in bad health Mean Std. Error
Constant type 1 -8.3 .
Constant type 2 -8.2 .
Age 0.1 .
Age squared 0.000001 .
Years of education -0.9 .
Years of education squared 0.006 .
Probability of being type 1 Mean Std. Error
Constant -1.95 .
Age when finished studying 0.02 .
Years of education 0.11 .
Region 0.18 .
Married 0.01 .
Bad health 0.01 .
Returns Mean Std. Error
Mean 0.11 .
Variance-Covariance matrix for the shocks Mean Std. Error
Variance preference for consumption 1.1 .
Variance preference for leisure 1.1 .
Variance covered sector wage offer 0.7 .
Variance uncovered sector wage offer 1.5 .
Variance returns 0.005 .
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